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INTRODUCTION

In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to include, “inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.” 1 Yet, Scott Louis Panetti, a man with a voluminous history of psychiatric disorders, is currently waiting to pay the ultimate penalty. 2
In 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Scott Panetti’s Eighth Amendment
challenge to his death sentence.3 In that case—Panetti v. Quarterman—the Supreme
Court, building upon the procedural requirements mandated in Ford, articulated the standard for determining whether the State may take the life of a mentally ill prisoner: a prisoner
must have knowledge of his imminent death and rationally understand the retributive
nexus between the crime and punishment before execution. 4
On remand to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the
court determined that Scott Panetti was competent for execution because he could articulate a relatively sophisticated understanding of the facts of his case and could rationally
articulate that his punishment was unjust.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed.6 However, the district court and the Fifth Circuit’s application of Panetti’s rational understanding standard violated the Eighth Amendment because it provided
no more protection to the mentally ill sentenced to death than that required by Ford, and
thus failing to satisfy the more exacting standards of Panetti.
This note argues that the district court and Fifth Circuit’s application of the rational
understanding standard was reprehensively deficient based on the courts’ holdings that
Scott Panetti, a man with a well-documented mental illness accompanied by gross delusions, was competent for execution in light of Ford.7 Part II examines the Court’s decision
in Ford v. Wainwright establishing a categorical exemption to protect the insane from execution, followed by an examination of the factual and procedural history of Panetti v.
Quarterman.8 Part III analyzes the district court and the Fifth Circuit’s application of the
rational understanding standard on remand, ultimately positing that the applications were
flawed because there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Scott Panetti possessed

1. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
2. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013). Moreover, since Ford, the 5th Circuit has not found a
single inmate incompetent for execution in Texas. See Scott Panetti, OFF CENTER MEDIA, http://www.off-center.com/projects/scott-panetti (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). For an understanding of the difference between insanity and mental illness, see Joseph Hess, The Death Penalty for Mentally Ill Offenders: Atkins, Roper, and Mitigation Factors Militate Against Categorical Exemption, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 93 (2012).
3. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007). The Court additionally reached the issue of whether the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 foreclosed Panetti’s second habeas petition, though this
note does not address the procedural issues in Panetti. For a discussion of whether Eighth Amendment jurisprudence will depend on substantive or procedural claims see Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There A
"Rational Understanding" of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
285, 297-300 (2007).
4. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958.
5. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
6. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 410.
7. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from
inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”); Panetti, 727 F.3d at 414; Panetti, 2008 WL
2338498, at *37.
8. Ford, 477 U.S. 399; Panetti, 551 U.S. 930.
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the requisite rational understanding of the nexus between his crime and his imminent execution.9 Part IV concludes by highlighting the courts’ failure to appreciate the effects of
severe mental illness on death row inmates, explains the importance of psychological science in competency hearings, advocates that placing a double evidentiary burden on the
prisoner minimizes the protective effect of the Panetti standard, and discusses the consequence of indigence on the seriously mentally ill prisoner.10
II. FRAMING A CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION FOR THE SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL
A.

Ford v. Wainwright

Ford v. Wainwright was the first case to explicitly create a categorical exemption
for prisoners sentenced to death. 11 In Ford, the Supreme Court held that executing the insane was repugnant to the Eighth Amendment. 12 In 1974, the State of Florida convicted
Alvin Bernard Ford of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.13 Though presumably competent at the time of the offense, trial, and sentencing, Ford gradually began
showing signs of mental illness leading up to his scheduled execution. 14 Particularly, he
had an obsession with the Ku Klux Klan and was under the delusion that there was a conspiracy to force him to commit suicide.15 He believed that the prison held 135 of his friends
and family hostage and that he had appointed nine new justices to the Florida Supreme
Court; in addition, he referred to himself as “Pope John Paul, III.” 16
Eventually, psychiatrist Dr. Jamal Amin evaluated Ford and diagnosed him as a paranoid schizophrenic with suicidal attributes. 17 After refusing further meetings with Dr.
Amin because of his belief that Dr. Amin joined the conspiracy against him, Ford met with
Dr. Harold Kaufman.18 When Dr. Kaufman asked Ford if the State would execute him,
Ford explained, “I can’t be executed because of the landmark case. I won. Ford v. State
will prevent executions all over.”19 Dr. Kaufman posited that Ford did not understand the
reasons for his execution and made no connection between his crime and the death penalty.20 Instead, Ford believed that the State could not execute him because he owned the
prison and controlled the governor using “mind waves.” 21
Subsequently, the Governor of Florida appointed three psychiatrists to evaluate Ford
and determine whether he possessed the capacity to understand the nature of the death
9. Panetti, 727 F.3d 398.
10. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962 (2007).
11. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10; Jonathan Greenberg, For Every Action There Is A Reaction: The Procedural
Pushback Against Panetti v. Quarterman, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 227, 255 (2012) (noting “Ford was the first
Eighth Amendment case to establish a categorical exclusion shielding defendants from capital punishment, not
because of conduct, but because of class-wide characteristics”). For further discussion of Ford, see Anthony J.
Bishop, Ford v. Wainwright: Insanity of The Death Row Inmate—A Second Chance, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
311 (1987).
12. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
13. Id. at 401.
14. Id. at 401-02.
15. Id. at 402.
16. Id.
17. Ford, 477 U.S. at 402-03.
18. Id. at 403.
19. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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penalty and the State’s reasons for imposing it on him. 22 One psychiatrist concluded that
Ford was cognitively capable of understanding the nature of the death penalty as well as
the State’s intent to execute him for committing murder. 23 Reaching a similar conclusion,
the second psychiatrist found Ford was psychotic, but fully understood the imminence of
his execution.24 The third psychiatrist, who believed Ford’s mental illness seemed contrived, also determined that he completely understood his situation. 25 Thereafter, without
comment, the governor signed a death warrant authorizing Ford’s execution. 26
After the court denied his motion for a competency hearing, Ford filed a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida requesting an evidentiary hearing to determine his competency to suffer execution.27 The district court denied Ford’s appeal and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.28 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
executing the insane violated the Eighth Amendment.29
1. Plurality Opinion in Ford v. Wainwright
The plurality in Ford began its analysis by examining the common law bar against
executing the insane and the various rationales for the rule. 30 At early English common
law, Sir Edward Coke explained that executing the insane was extremely inhumane and
cruel and served no consequentialist purpose.31 Similarly, William Blackstone commented:
[I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed
when under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself. Also, if a
man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it: because
he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought.
And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be
tried: for how can he make his defence? [sic] If, after he be tried and
found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be
pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory,
execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the
English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have
alleged something in stay of judgment or execution. 32
22. Ford, 477 U.S. at 403; see Peggy M. Tobolowsky, To Panetti and Beyond-Defining and Identifying Capital Offenders Who Are Too "Insane" to Be Executed, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 369, 385 (2007) (indicating that each
of the psychiatrists appointed by the governor, spent only thirty minutes interviewing Ford).
23. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404-05.
29. Id. at 404. As a secondary issue, the Court considered whether “the District Court should have held a
hearing on petitioner’s claim.” Id.
30. Id. at 406.
31. Id. at 407 (stating “by intendment of Law the execution of the offender is for example, . . . but so it is not
when a mad man is executed, but should be a miserable spectacle, both against Law and of extream inhumanity
and cruelty, and can be no example to others”) (quoting 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)).
32. Id. at 406-07 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES D4 – 25).
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The plurality then discussed “The Common Law 5,”— the five most common rationales for the prohibition of executing the insane: (1) executing the insane was repugnant
to humanity; (2) executing the insane provided no example to others, thus it served no
deterrent purpose; (3) religious underpinnings condemned executing the insane; (4) executing the insane was superfluous because insanity was its own punishment; and (5) retribution was not served because an insane person’s life has less value than that of a sane
person.33
Concluding that the common law bar against executing the insane and the accompanying rationales remained valid in 1986, the plurality held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited the State from executing the insane. 34 According to the plurality, “Whether its
aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or
to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance,
the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.” 35 For the plurality, the challenging issue of whether a prisoner is too insane to comprehend the nature of the ultimate
penalty requires trustworthy fact-finding and evidence conducive to establishing a neutral,
sound, and professional determination. 36 Essentially, the plurality recognized that in a civilized society it is imperative to employ fair principles to resolve whether a prisoner is
competent to face the penalty of death by execution. 37
2. Justice Powell’s Concurrence in Ford v. Wainwright
Though the plurality’s broad holding in Ford was that the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing the insane, Justice Powell’s narrow concurrence is the controlling opinion because no opinion obtained the required number of Justices to reach a majority. 38
Justice Powell began his concurrence by stating that the common law prohibited executing
the insane because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and he concluded that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited it for that same reason. 39 Justice Powell’s concurrence, in
part, attempted to define “the mental awareness” a prisoner must possess upon execution
to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. 40
Justice Powell essentially rejected Blackstone’s common law rationale that executing an insane prisoner is wrong because the prisoner, if competent, may have provided
exculpatory information prior to execution. 41 According to Justice Powell, contemporary

33. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407-08; see also J. Amy Dillard, Madness Alone Punishes the Madman: The Search
for Moral Dignity in the Court's Competency Doctrine As Applied in Capital Cases, 79 TENN. L. REV. 461 (2012)
(providing a more in-depth discussion of common law rationales for the bar against executing the insane).
34. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10.
35. Id. at 410.
36. Id. at 414 (“psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness [and] on the
appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms”) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,
81 (1985)); id. at 417-18 (indicating that “in light of the clear need for trustworthiness in any fact finding . . . .”).
37. Id. at 417.
38. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977)); id. at 409-10.
39. Id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring) (also considering the procedures required by states to avoid de novo
review in deferral court under 28 U.S.C. § 225(d)).
41. Id. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring).
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jurisprudence provided greater review of convictions and afforded certain due process protections that were largely unavailable at common law. 42 These mechanisms left Blackstone’s rationale with little merit.43 Justice Powell accepted Coke’s proposition that the
purpose of the death penalty is to deter future crime—a consequentialist goal—which does
not justify executing the insane because doing so is repugnant to human decency. 44 Justice
Powell concluded that Coke’s consequentialist rationale retained vitality, adding that executing the insane cannot satisfy retributivist goals because retribution depends upon the
prisoner’s awareness of the penalty and the purpose for it.45 He also recognized that society
commonly valued the ability to prepare mentally and spiritually for death.46 Thus, because
executing the insane offends common ideas of morality and does not fulfill one of the chief
justifications of the death penalty, many states, even at the time of Ford, required a minimum showing that a death row inmate understood his or her imminent execution and the
reason for it.47
In light of the various rationales regarding the prohibition against executing the insane, Justice Powell agreed that as a prerequisite to an inmate’s execution, the inmate must
“know the fact of [his or her] impending execution and the reason for it.” 48 Perhaps the
thrust of Justice Powell’s argument, or at least what is most relative to Scott Panetti, was
that an inmate must know of the impending execution because an inmate can only prepare
for death if he or she knows that death is approaching. 49 In addition, an inmate must know
the reason for the impending execution because there is no retribution if a prisoner cannot
appreciate the retributive connection between crime and punishment. 50
B.

The Scott Panetti Story

From 1986 to 2014, the State of Texas has executed almost 500 prisoners, and the
Fifth Circuit has not found a single Texas inmate incompetent for execution, including

42. Ford, 477 U.S. at 419-21 (Powell, J., concurring) (“if after judgment he become of non sane memory, his
execution shall be spared; for were he of sound memory he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 1 M. HALE. PLEAS OF THE CROWN 35 (1936)). Justice Powell also
cites 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 388-89 (9th ed. 1783).
43. Ford, 477 U.S. at 419-21 (Powell, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 419. n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). See 3 E. COKE. INSTITUTES 6 (1794). (“[A] miserable spectacle .
. . of extream inhumanity and cruelty . . . can be no example to others.”). Consequentialists recognize that the
purpose of punishment is to create positive societal consequences, such as rehabilitating the offender, incapacitating the offender, and deterring the offender and other members of society from engaging in criminal activity.
Retributivists, though, believe that the offender’s conduct justifies punishment simply because he or she deserves
it. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV.
843, 856-57, 859-860 (2002).
45. Ford, 477 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 421-22 (Powell, J., concurring) (“A person is unfit to be executed if because of a mental condition
he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of such sentence.”) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985 &
Supp. 1986)).
48. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that “[s]uch a standard appropriately defines the kind of
mental deficiency that should trigger the Eighth Amendment prohibition”).
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 11, at 231 (explaining that Powell’s test sets the “constitutional floor,”
allowing states to create heightened competency requirements). The Supreme Court ultimately remanded Alvin
Ford’s competency determination and the district court held that he was sane. Ford died of natural causes while
his appeal was pending. Alvin Ford, 37, Dies; Stricken on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/09/obituaries/alvin-ford-37-dies-stricken-on-death-row.html.
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Scott Panetti.51 Scott Panetti exhibited signs of mental illness well before he murdered his
wife’s parents and well before he arrived on Texas’s death row. 52 With the exception of a
near-drowning accident at age five, which may have somewhat hindered his cognitive development, Panetti exhibited all the characteristics of an ordinary child.53 However, as a
teenager he drew further away from his family. 54 On some days he acted completely normal, and on others he seemed like a completely different person. 55 His first documented
encounter with a mental health professional was at age eighteen.56
In 1978, shortly after his first evaluation, Panetti sustained severe electrical burns
and a psychiatrist diagnosed him with moderate to severe sociopathic personality disorder
and early schizophrenia.57 His symptoms included a low frustration tolerance, flight of
ideas, hallucinations of red flashing lights, and confusing his voice with others. 58 Three
years later he involuntarily entered a psychiatric hospital where he received treatment for
substance abuse and aggressive, delusional, and paranoid behavior.59 Then, in 1986, Panetti entered a drug treatment center where, upon admission, evaluators diagnosed him as
psychotic.60 While at the treatment facility, Panetti chased his wife’s car, leaving with her
only to return the following day.61 The next month, doctors diagnosed Panetti with chronic
undifferentiated schizophrenia.62 Panetti transferred to another psychiatric hospital, where
his wife described his episodes of paranoid behavior as including a belief that the devil
occupied his belongings causing him to bury his furniture outside and to nail the curtains
shut so that the neighbors would not film him. 63 His wife also explained that Panetti presented a coherent front, or the appearance of normalcy, after his transfer, but soon disintegrated.64

51. Executed Offenders, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2014),
https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_executions_by_year.html (providing a list of executions); Scott Panetti, supra note 2; Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming the trial court’s determination that
Scott Panetti is competent for execution).
52. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Panetti, v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No. 06-6407) (noting “Panetti
suffered from a severe mental illness long before he ever arrived on Texas’s death row”). Mary Solbrig, an
attorney, who was once Scott’s payee for SSI benefits, stated Scott mentally deteriorated in the last twenty years.
Scott Panetti, supra note 2.
53. Id.
54. Id. His mother, Yvonne, opined that she first thought his bizarre behavior was merely a phase, which he
would out grow. Yvonne commented that he was a terrific child, but exhibited bizarre behavior during his teenaged years. On one occasion, when he was sixteen, Yvonne remembered Scott acting like he heard music, and
when she asked, he responded, “it is just the music in my hear.” Id.
55. Id. It was also around this age when Scott’s sister noticed that he was sick. She recalls Scott incessantly
calling a radio station, requesting that they play his song, and referring to himself as “Sergeant Iron Horse.” Id.
56. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
57. Id.; THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 153 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n
4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR] (defining schizophrenia as at least two of the following symptoms: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, and/or negative symptoms, such as affective flattering, alogia, or avolition).
58. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *4.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *5.
61. Id.
62. Id.; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 57, at 156 (explaining that undifferentiated means that an individual meets
the criteria for schizophrenia, but do not meet the specific criteria for paranoid, disorganized or catatonic schizophrenia).
63. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *5. See also Panetti, supra note 2 (explaining that Scott believed that the
devil was out to get him and he washed his belongings to exercise the devil).
64. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *5.
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After Panetti’s release, he and his wife separated and he moved to Wisconsin where
he entered yet another hospital for psychiatric treatment.65 Based on Panetti’s statements
that he heard strange voices and music since adolescence and his dependence on controlled
substances “to quiet the voices,” the psychiatrist diagnosed Panetti with chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia and alcohol and drug dependence. 66 That same month, he entered a
hospital to treat his suicidal thoughts. 67 The psychiatrist diagnosed Panetti with major depression with psychotic features.68
Panetti then moved back to Texas and returned to the drug treatment center. 69 The
evaluator at the treatment center “emphatically state[d], ‘[t]here is no doubt in my mind
that he is delusional and that at this point he is unable to have any realistic orientation
towards his own situation . . . I’m also sure that he is unable to function in any form or
fashion at this point.’”70 Over the next three months, Panetti received treatment for
schizoaffective disorder and alcohol and substance abuse.71
For the next three years, Panetti remained relatively stable; he received outpatient
treatment and married his second wife. 72 However, in 1990, Panetti swung a cavalry sword
at his wife, threatening to kill her, their child, his father-in-law, and himself by burning
down the house.73 This resulted in another involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital.74 Around this same time, he called himself “Sergeant Iron Horse.” 75 In 1991, Panetti
checked himself into a hospital, where evaluators noted that Panetti had some preoccupation with religion and poor impulse control. 76 He continued outpatient treatment intermittently for the next year, but eventually stopped taking his antipsychotic medications and
going to his appointments.77 A notation in Panetti’s outpatient treatment file from September 1, 1992 indicated that Panetti failed to refill his prescribed medications. 78
Seven days after that notation, on September 8, 1992, Panetti shaved his head,
donned military camouflage fatigues, and went to the home of his parents-in-law—Joe and
Amanda Alvarado—with a sawed-off shotgun and a deer rifle.79 He shot Joe and Amanda

65. Id. at *6.
66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id.; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 57, at 168, 174-75 (explaining Major Depressive Disorder as having two or
more Major Depressive Episodes, which include at least five of the following symptoms existing during the same
two week period, representing a change in previous function, and at least one of the symptoms is either depressed
mood or loss of interest or pleasure: depressed mood most of the day or nearly every day; diminished interest or
pleasure; significant weight loss; recurrent insomnia or hypersomnia; psychomotor agitation or retardation; fatigue or loss of energy almost daily; feelings of worthlessness or excessive guilt; diminished ability to think
clearly; and/or recurrently thinking of death).
69. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *7.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *8.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *8.
75. Id. See also Scott Panetti, supra note 2 (wherein Panetti’s sister recalls him referring to himself as “Sarge”
as early as eighteen or nineteen).
76. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *8.
77. Id. at *9.
78. Id.
79. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 7. For a more detailed account of the crime, see Panetti, 2008 WL
2338498, at *9 (quoting State v. Panetti, 891 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App. 1994)); see also Scott Panetti, supra note
2.
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in front of his wife and daughter.80 Panetti forced his wife and daughter into the bunkhouse
where he lived.81 After a standoff with police that lasted most of the night, Panetti eventually released his wife and daughter without physical harm. 82
The State of Texas indicted Panetti on September 18, 1992. 83 Based on Panetti’s
long history of mental illness, the trial judge ordered a psychiatric evaluation and appointed Preston Douglas as his defense counsel. 84 Dr. E. Lee Simes evaluated Panetti and
reported that Panetti did not know what year it was, nor could he identify the President. 85
Panetti’s thought process was loose and tangential, meaning disorganized, and he reported
to Dr. Simes that he experienced auditory and visual hallucinations, including visions of
Jesus Christ visiting his cell.86 The doctor also reported that Panetti experienced other
chronic delusions, including a preoccupation with religion, and that he suffered from “obvious mental difficulties.”87 Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of Panetti’s
mental incompetence, Dr. Simes concluded that Panetti was competent. 88 The court held
a competency hearing and the jury found Panetti competent to stand trial. 89 Months later,
Panetti refused to take his anti-psychotic medication, claiming that God cured his schizophrenia and requested that the trial court allow him to represent himself. 90 The trial court
granted his request.91
Panetti wore a purple cowboy outfit and applied for more than 200 subpoenas, requesting testimony from, among others, John F. Kennedy, the Pope, and Jesus Christ. 92
Panetti’s standby counsel said his “performance was ‘bizarre,’ ‘scary,’ and ‘trance-like,’
rendering his trial ‘a judicial farce and a mockery of self-representation.’”93 The jury found
Panetti guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. 94 After nearly a decade of appeals,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether the Eighth Amendment permits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness deprives him of the ‘mental capacity
to understand that [he or she] is being executed as punishment for a crime.’”95
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING STANDARD AND THE LOWER

80. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 7.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *11.
84. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 7-8.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.; cf. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *11-12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 8. For an analysis of Panetti’s proceedings at trial see Richard J.
Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
257 (2007).
89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 8. The judge ordered a mistrial in the first competency trial, because
the jury deliberated for almost twelve hours. It was the second jury that found Scott competent. Id.
90. Id. at 10-11. Panetti referred to the curing as his “April Fool’s Day revelation[.]” Id.
91. Id. at 11.
92. Id. at 11-16. Panetti recanted Jesus Christ’s subpoena, stating “Jesus Christ, he doesn't need a subpoena.
He's right here with me, and we'll get into that.” Id.
93. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 936
(2007)).
94. See State v. Panetti, 891 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App. 1994).
95. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 954.
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COURTS’ HOLLOW APPLICATION
A.

Panetti v. Quarterman

In Panetti v. Quarterman, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner must have
knowledge of his or her imminent death and rationally understand the retributive nexus
between the crime and the punishment before execution, finding that the court of appeals’
determination of Panetti’s competence rested on a flawed interpretation of Ford.96 Though
the Court ultimately remanded Panetti’s competency determination, its discussion regarding the integrity of Panetti’s fixed delusions demonstrated the Court’s acceptance that Panetti had a true psychotic disorder that may have prevented him from rationally understanding that the State intended to take his life as a consequence of the murder of his in-laws.97
The Court reasoned that whether Panetti’s delusions prevented him from comprehending
the retributive connection between his impending death and the murder of his in-laws was
a question for the lower court to resolve with the aid of psychiatric science. 98
The competency for execution standard applied by the court of appeals was whether
the prisoner was aware of his execution and the reason for it. 99 The Court held that this
standard was too restrictive to comply with the Eighth Amendment because it disregarded
a prisoner’s delusional belief system so long as the prisoner in fact knew that the State
“identified his [or her] crimes as the reason for his execution.” 100 The Ford majority suggested that delusions are relevant to comprehension and awareness if they impair the prisoner’s ability to grasp a rational understanding of the reasons for the execution. 101 In essence, the court of appeals erred in finding that Panetti was competent for execution based
solely on his ability to articulate that the State would execute him and the State’s reasons
for the execution, without determining whether Panetti’s delusional belief system prevented him from truly appreciating that his impending death was a consequence of his
capital crimes.102 The Court reasoned that the competency for execution standard applied
by the court of appeals failed to align with Ford because Ford emphasized that retributivism requires that the offender recognize the gravity of his or her offense. 103
As recognized by the Court, the record contained a significant amount of evidence
supporting that Panetti suffered from severe delusions. 104 Such evidence indicated that
Panetti’s fixed delusional belief system prevented him from truly grasping that his execution was a consequence of his crimes. 105 One of Panetti’s experts stated that his mental
health issues were symptomatic of schizoaffective disorder, which caused him to have a
“genuine delusion” regarding his understanding of the reasons for his execution. 106 The

96. Id. at 958.
97. Id. at 955.
98. Id. at 962.
99. Id. at 956 (citing Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815, 819 (5 th Cir. 2006) (quoting Barnard v. Collins, 13 F.3d
871, 877 (5th Cir. 1994)).
100. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956, 958.
101. Id. at 958.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 959.
104. Id. at 956.
105. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 954-56.
106. Id.; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 57, at 159 (describing schizoaffective disorder as “an uninterrupted period
of illness during which, as time there is either a Major Depressive Episode, a Manic Episode, or a Mixed Episode
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expert explained that Panetti believed he was “[engaged in] spiritual warfare . . . between
the demons and the forces of the darkness and God and the angels and the forces of
light.”107 Although Panetti could articulate on a superficial level that the State sought to
execute him for his crimes, the expert determined that Panetti truly believed the State’s
reason was a sham to conceal the State’s true purpose—to stop him from preaching the
gospel.108 Three other expert witnesses reached similar conclusions regarding the genuineness and severity of Panetti’s delusions. 109
The State’s expert witnesses opined that Panetti’s purported beliefs did not indicate
incompetence because Panetti could periodically think clearly and lucidly. 110 However,
the Court dismissed the State’s witnesses’ explanation that Panetti was competent because
the Court accepted Panetti’s rebuttal witness, who provided that schizophrenia does not
necessarily diminish a person’s cognitive ability. 111 The rebuttal witness stated that a person with schizophrenia can demonstrate rational thought in connection with reality one
moment, but when stimulated, his or her lucid thought becomes tangential. 112 The Court
additionally stated that an un-medicated schizophrenic can sporadically hold an orderly
conversation but the ability to do so is dependent upon whether the discussion pertains to
the person’s fixed delusional belief system. 113
Though the Court remanded Panetti’s competency determination, it seemed convinced that Panetti’s delusions were genuine and that such delusions might “put [his]
awareness of [the] link between [his] crime and its punishment in a context so far removed
from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.” 114 It was not enough that
Panetti was aware of the State’s identified link between his crimes and the punishment. 115
He must have a rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution. 116 Thus the
court’s task on remand was to determine whether Panetti’s delusional beliefs prevented
him from comprehending that his execution was a consequence of his crimes—not a consequence of demonic spiritual warfare. 117 The Court was clear that psychiatric science—
including the conclusions of physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts in the field—
should determine the extent to which Panetti’s delusions prevented him from appreciating
the retributive connection between his crimes and his punishment. 118
B.

Evidence Presented at Panetti’s Subsequent Habeas Corpus Proceeding

The evidence presented in Panetti II failed to meet the Panetti standard because it
did not demonstrate that Panetti rationally understood the nexus between the murder of his
concurrent with symptoms that meet [the criteria for] Schizophrenia;” during the time of the illness there are
delusions are hallucinations for at least two weeks; the symptoms that meet the criteria for a mood episode exist
for a substantial portion of the illness; and the disturbance is not a result of a substance or medical condition).
107. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 954-56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 955.
111. Id.
112. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 955.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 960.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 960.
118. Id. at 962.
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in-laws and his execution.119
1. Psychiatric Evaluations
The district court included testimony from three of Panetti’s experts in its opinion. 120
First, Dr. Leslie Rosenstein evaluated Panetti in 2007 and administered more than sixteen
tests.121 She remarked that during cognitive testing, Panetti “put[] forth good effort” and
he demonstrated disappointment and frustration when he did not perform perfectly.122 In
addition, his speech was clear and normal in rate, rhythm, and tone. 123 However, Panetti
demonstrated difficulty focusing his attention, often becoming tangential. 124 She concluded that the likelihood of Panetti’s malingering was low and that his behavior was indicative of frontal-executive deficits, which are symptomatic of chronic psychotic disorders like schizoaffective disorder and schizophrenia. 125
Two more of Panetti’s experts provided opinions as to whether he had a rational
understanding of the retributive connection between his crimes and punishment. 126 Dr.
Mary Alice Conroy interviewed Panetti in December, 2007. 127 She stated that Panetti’s
speech was less pressured than when she evaluated him in 2004.128 Consistent with Dr.
Rosenstein’s evaluation, Dr. Conroy described that Panetti intermittently provided logical
and organized responses to her questions, but would subsequently devolve, “becom[ing]
increasingly tangential unless redirected.”129 She reported that while interviewing Panetti,
he talked of conspiracies involving corporations and the Bush family in league with the
devil.130 When Dr. Conroy asked Panetti about his execution, Panetti explained that God
revealed to him that he would become a very old preacher. 131 He also described two instances when angels visited him, disguised as correctional officers. 132
119. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
120. Id. at *19-22.
121. Report or Affidavit of Leslie D. Rosenstein, Panetti v. Quarterman, No. 04CV00042, 2007 WL 7119864
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2007):
Dr. Rosenstein is a clinical neuropsychologist, board certified by the American Board of
Professional Psychology. She practices in the Neuropsychology Clinic, P.C. in Austin and
provides consultation to the Mary Lee Foundation Rehabilitation Center. She is a member
of the American and Texas Psychological Associations, the International and Austin Neuropsychological Societies, and is a board member of the American Academy of Clinical
Neuropsychology and the American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology Foundation.
Dr. Rosenstein has also served as a consultant for the Jurisprudence and Oral Examinations
administered by the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists. She received a
bachelors degree and a doctorate of Psychology from the University of Texas and completed a doctoral specialization in Clinical Psychology with a major in Neuropsychology
at the University of Arizona. Leslie D. Rosenstein, Ph.D., Texas State Directory.
https://www.txdirectory.com/online/person/?id=37992&office=20103.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *19-20.
126. Id. at *20-22.
127. Forensic Evaluation Competence for Execution of Mary Alice Conroy, Ph.D., Panetti v. Quarterman, No.
04CV00042, 2008 WL 7650343 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2008). She also interviewed him twice in August of 2004.
Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *21-22.
131. Id.
132. Forensic Evaluation Competence for Execution of Mary Alice Conroy, Ph.D., supra note 127.
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In addition, Dr. Conroy administered the Structured Interview of Reported System
(“SIRS”) to measure forms of dissimulation, such as malingering. 133 Panetti’s results revealed honesty in seven of the eight primary scales of the SIRS, thus yielding a ninetyfive percent probability that he was not malingering. 134 In Dr. Conroy’s opinion, Panetti’s
symptoms demonstrated “a very real schizophrenic condition.” 135 She ultimately diagnosed Panetti with Schizoaffective Disorder, denoting that Panetti’s level of confusion and
mood varied, but his underlying thought disorder remained consistent. 136 According to Dr.
Conroy, Panetti did not rationally understand that the State sought to execute him as retribution for his crimes.137 Instead, he genuinely believed that evil forces sought his death to
silence him from preaching God’s word, and that he was invulnerable to execution because
God wanted him to become a very old preacher.138 Dr. David Self, Panetti’s third expert,
reached the same conclusions regarding Panetti’s mental health and competency, adding
that Panetti was also incompetent to stand trial.139
The district court’s opinion also contained testimony from six State experts, including three deposed psychotherapists the prison hired to conduct routine assessments of
death row inmates.140 Dr. Tom Allen did not provide an opinion with regard to Panetti’s
competence for execution but did provide an assessment of Panetti’s psychological functioning.141 He concluded that the probability of Panetti’s malingering was high because his

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Dr. Conroy concluded that Panetti was schizophrenic for the following reasons:
Mr. Panetti evidenced this disorder over time for a number of years prior to the murder of
his in-laws. His delusions have a consistent theme and his symptoms are described by
observers with relative consistency. Mr. Panetti has responded favorably in the past to
treatment with antipsychotic agents. The symptoms go well beyond those that could be
attributed simply to substance abuse and have persisted in the absence of substances. The
type of thought disorder displayed by Mr. Panetti during lengthy interviews (i.e., flight of
ideas, loose associations, tangential thinking) is nearly impossible to fake. Mr. Panetti does
not claim obvious symptoms of mental illness, claims one often sees in those who malinger. For example, when asked directly and given every opportunity to endorse hallucinations, he demurs. He is currently adamant that he is not mentally ill, saying that he probably was at one time (even admitting to symptoms in the distant past) but insisting that he
was a “born again April Fool,” when God healed him on April 1, 1995. His behavior during this evaluation was totally consistent with reports of his behavior in TDCJ over recent
years. Almost everyone interviewed on the record noted that he does not socialize with
others, but preaches to them constantly - even in the face of rejection and hostility. This is
totally consistent with his delusional belief that he is on Death Row on God's mission and
that the forces of evil are trying to execute him to silence his preaching. Neuropsychological assessment results are consistent with a psychotic process. On the only test of functional malingering administered, the SIRS, Mr. Panetti's scores indicate a 95% probability
that he is responding honestly.
Id.
136. Id. Dr. Conroy explained that:
Schizoaffective Disorder is a severe and chronic psychotic disturbance. It is often characterized by significant thought disorder (i.e., flight of ideas, loose associations, disorganization, tangential speech), hallucinations, and delusional thinking. Mood and affect may
change with some frequency; however, some of the underlying psychotic ideas are consistent over time.
Id.
137. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *22 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
138. Id.
139. Id. at *21.
140. Id. at *23-27.
141. Id. at *23-24.
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scores on the Green’s Word Memory Test were similar to experimental groups of patients
asked to fake schizophrenia and because Panetti’s past schizophrenic-like behaviors were
symptomatic of substance abuse.142
Dr. Alan Waldman was skeptical that Panetti had any psychotic disorder whatsoever,
and thus concluded that he had a rational understanding.143 In the course of Dr. Waldman’s
interview, he asked Panetti direct questions about the reason for his execution.144 For example, when Dr. Waldman asked Panetti why he was on death row, Panetti responded,
“[t]hey’re trying to rub me out, it’s unjust.”145 When Dr. Waldman asked Panetti why it
was unjust Panetti explained, “it is a conspiracy.”146 Dr. Waldman next asked Panetti why
the conspiracy targeted him, and Panetti provided a “nonsensical personalized religious
answer.”147 Dr. Waldman stated that when Panetti wanted to answer a question he was
organized and coherent, but when he did not want to answer a question he replied with
nonsensical religious statements.148 Contrary to his statement that Panetti answered nonsensically, Dr. Waldman also explained that Panetti recited “biblical response[s], but [they
were] always organized and understandable.”149 Dr. Waldman essentially asserted that
each of Panetti’s diagnoses of psychotic disorders were incorrect and that Panetti’s “socalled ‘delusion’ [was] wholly self-serving and [had] but one purpose that [was] to spare
him from the sentence handed down by the jury of his peers.”150
Additionally, Dr. Priscilla Ray provided an expert opinion regarding the extent to
which mental health experts are able to aid the court in determining competency for execution eligibility.151 She explained that while psychiatric science can aid the courts, there
are limitations because no objective test can determine what someone knows; therefore,
an assessment of a mentally ill prisoner’s capacity to understand is more feasible than his
or her actual understanding.152
In addition, the State deposed three psychotherapists who routinely evaluated death
row inmates.153 None could independently recollect Panetti and the reports of their routine
assessments were unremarkable.154 Further, none of the deposed witnesses provided an
opinion as to whether Panetti’s delusions prevented him from having a rational understanding of the nexus between his crimes and punishment. 155
In essence, only one of the State’s experts actually determined whether Panetti had
a rational understanding of the reasons for his execution. 156 That expert concluded that

142. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, *23-24.
143. Id. at *24-26.
144. The Evaluation of Scott Louis Panetti of Alan J. Waldman, M.D., Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA042-SS, 2007 WL 7085068 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
145. Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id.
148. Id. at *3.
149. The Evaluation of Scott Louis Panetti of Alan J. Waldman, M.D., supra note 144, at *9.
150. Id. at *11. However, Panetti’s delusions existed before any motive existed, years before he murdered his
wife’s parents. Id.
151. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
152. Id. The state lost on this issue in Panetti. Id.
153. Id. at *28.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *24-26.
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Panetti rationally understood his punishment because he doubted that Panetti suffered from
any psychotic disorder whatsoever, a finding that was unsupported by decades of diagnoses, Dr. Rosenstein’s testimony, and the Supreme Court’s own statement that Scott Panetti
suffered from a psychotic disorder.157 Alternatively, two of Panetti’s experts testified that
Panetti’s gross delusions, caused by his severe mental illness, prevented him from rationally understanding that his execution was a consequence of his crimes.158
2. Testimony of Inmates, Guards, and Staff
The district court opinion included testimony from Panetti’s fellow inmates, guards,
and staff who attested to Panetti’s unwavering erratic behavior. 159 One inmate deemed
Panetti’s demeanor bizarre stating, “one minute everything[] [was] good, the next minute
he[] [was] ranting and raving fire and brimstone again, like flipping a switch.” 160 As previously explained by the Supreme Court in Panetti v. Quarterman, this behavior is entirely
consistent with schizophrenia because a person with schizophrenia can demonstrate rational thought in one moment and tangential thought the next. 161 In addition, the inmate
testified that Panetti screamed Bible passages at the top of his lungs, often up to seven
hours a day, and when other inmates yelled, threw water, and shot sharp objects at him, he
appeared unfazed.162 The other inmate gave similar testimony, adding that Panetti insisted
that the inmate call him “Ranahan.”163 Additionally, five death row guards and staff members also attested to Panetti’s compulsive preoccupation with religion. 164
3. Recorded Conversations Between Panetti and His Family
The State also presented eleven hours of audio recordings of visits between Panetti
and his family.165 The district court explained that Panetti’s pace of speech remained normal even when he spoke of corrupt Texas politics, never becoming irrational, tangential,
or pressured.166 In addition, when he spoke of corrupt politics and the trial court’s
“screwups” and made the statement, “Fredericksburg had to have a hanging[,]” he did not
mention spiritual corruption.167 The court described his comments as remarkably self-centered.168 He often quoted scripture and spoke religiously but did not rant.169 In initiating a
conversation about the death penalty, Panetti expressed his moral opposition to it while

157. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 960 (2007); Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *5-8, *20, *25, *28.
158. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *21-22.
159. Id. at *26-28.
160. Id. at *26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 555.
162. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *27-28. Sadly, one staff additionally testified that the guards placed trouble inmates in Panetti’s cell
as punishment. The courts did not address Dr. Waldman’s interview with Phyllis Morrow, the prison’s mailroom
supervisor, whose opinion was that Panetti was not schizophrenic, because Panetti did not act like her nephew
who had schizophrenia. Her testimony is entirely unscientific and based upon her subjective conception of schizophrenia. Id.
165. Id. at *28-30.
166. Id. at *28.
167. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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maintaining organized speech.170 With regard to Panetti’s statements about his habeas case,
the court explained that Panetti “demonstrate[d] a fairly sophisticated understanding of his
circumstances.”171 As an example, the court pointed out that Panetti instructed his parents
to tell a member of his defense team about a character witness and seemed paranoid about
the conversation being recorded, assuring any listeners that he was not in cahoots with the
character witness.172
4. Culmination of the District Court’s Evidence
In sum, the district court’s opinion included more evidence of Panetti’s incompetency than of his competency.173 Three experts for Panetti concluded that he was not malingering and did not rationally understand that his execution resulted from murdering his
in-laws.174 Three inmates and five guards testified that Panetti’s insane behavior was constant and existed outside the purview of evaluators.175 The court’s opinion provided no
testimony evidence asserting that Panetti stated that he knew his execution was a consequence of his in-law’s murder.176 The district court rested its determination of Panetti’s
competency on only two factual bases: the testimony of a State’s witness, Dr. Waldman,
and the recorded conversations between Panetti and his family. 177
C.

The District Court’s Misapplication of the Rational Understanding Standard

Though the district court articulated the appropriate standard, its application was
reprehensively deficient based on the extreme dissonance between the evidence presented
and the court’s conclusion that Panetti had a rational understanding of the nexus between
murdering his in-laws and his execution.178 The court found Panetti competent for three
primary reasons, all of which were fundamentally flawed due to the court’s unscientific
conception of mental illness.179 First, Panetti had a sophisticated understanding of his
case.180 Second, Panetti understood the adversarial process.181 Third, Panetti believed that
the State and trial court were corrupt, and that it was wrong to execute him because he was
mentally ill at the time he committed his crimes. 182
1. Panetti’s “Sophisticated Understanding” of His Case
The court’s first premise was that Panetti necessarily rationally understood his punishment because he had “a fairly sophisticated understanding of his case.” 183 The court
supported this conclusion with Panetti’s reference to a character witness who could testify
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id. at *28-29.
Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *29.
Id. at *20-29.
Id. at *19-22.
Id. at *26-28.
Id. at *20-29.
Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *24-26, *36.
Id. at *20-29.
Id. at *24-26, *28-29, *36.
Id. at *28-29.
Id.
Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36.
Id. at *28-29.
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to his preaching and Panetti’s statement that his parents should not worry about the outcome of his competency hearing because he could appeal it to the Supreme Court. 184 However, in making this determination, the district court did not comply with the Supreme
Court’s instruction in Panetti to meaningfully consider expert testimony and develop a
record supporting the competency determination. 185 Instead, the district court excluded
much of the expert testimony from its analysis, including two of Panetti’s psychiatric evaluators who concluded that Panetti was not competent for execution, and instead substituted
its own conclusions.186 By ignoring the Supreme Court’s instructions, the district court
deemed Panetti’s delusions irrelevant because it concluded he was cognitively aware of
his circumstances.187
Psychiatric science establishes that it is unwarranted for a court to infer that a prisoner rationally understands the reason for his or her execution merely because he can regurgitate facts he heard.188 A schizophrenic can articulate a semantic connection, or identify the State’s purported reason for his execution while believing that reason is a sham. 189
The court’s conclusion that Panetti’s sophisticated understanding of his case necessarily
meant that he rationally understood the retributive value of his execution is the type of
danger noted by the National Alliance on Mental Illness (“NAMI”), which remarks that
courts “assessing competency repeatedly engage in factual reasoning that is wholly unsupported by the scientific understanding of psychotic disorders.”190
2. Panetti’s Understanding of the Adversarial Process
The district court based its second premise on Panetti’s understanding of the adversarial process reflected in his rational understanding of the case, as evidenced by his willingness to cooperate with Dr. Rosenstein and unwillingness to cooperate with the State’s
experts.191 The defense argued that his refusal to cooperate with the State’s experts was
because of his fixed delusion that the experts were part of a demonic conspiracy. 192 The
court dismissed this explanation, stating that Panetti’s recognition of the State’s witness
as a member of “other side” meant that he rationally understood the adversarial process. 193
In actuality, Panetti’s understanding of the adversarial nature of his case was, once again,
nothing more than a reflection of his cognitive ability to factually understand his case. 194
A prisoner can have awareness of various aspects of the world around him or her, including
the adversarial nature of habeas proceedings, yet harbor delusional beliefs.195 Regardless,
184. Id. at *28-29.
185. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962 (2007); Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *28-29.
186. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 962; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *28-29.
187. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 962; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *28-29.
188. Bonnie, supra note 88, at 257. Essentially, a semantic connection is a prisoner’s generalized identification
of the State’s purported reason for execution, or the superficial realization that “people who are convicted of
crimes are sent to prison or executed.” Further, psychotic decompensation allows the prisoner to possess a semantic connection, while it distorts his ability to appreciate the significance of his punishment. Id.
189. Brief for Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness as Amicus Curiae at 5, Ferguson v. Crews, 134 S. Ct. 33 (2013)
(No. 13-5507) [hereinafter NAMI].
190. Id.
191. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36.
192. Id.
193. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 955 (2007).
195. NAMI, supra note 189, at 13.
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the court failed to explain how Panetti’s understanding of the adversarial process meant
that he had a rational understanding of his punishment, nor did it provide a reason or any
scientific explanation for dismissing the defense’s argument that Panetti was speaking of
forces of darkness when he referenced the “other side.” 196
3. Panetti’s Belief in the Unjustness of His Sentence
The district court’s final premise was that Panetti had a rational understanding of his
punishment because he spoke of corrupt Texas politics in a non-delusional manner, and
that he believed it was wrong for the State to execute him because he was insane at the
time he committed the murders.197 Again, the court erred by substituting its own unscientific and subjective opinion for the judgment of qualified psychiatrists. 198 With regard to
the recordings, the court extracted a few isolated statements from hours of audio, minimizing the extent of Panetti’s delusions and mental illness.199 In doing so, it ignored statements
that demonstrated Panetti’s incompetence and rested its findings on a misconceived idea
of mental illness.200 For instance, the court explained that Panetti’s statement that the trial
judge was corrupt indicated Panetti’s ability to discuss his case in a non-delusional manner; however, the court did not mention that Panetti also referred to the trial judge as a
“devil worshipper.”201 As yet another example, the court noted that Panetti’s recognition
that Dr. Waldman treated mental illness necessarily meant that Panetti understood that his
execution resulted from him killing his in-laws.202 However, the court does not explain
how Panetti’s cognizance of mental illness, or Dr. Waldman’s occupation, necessitated a
finding that he understood the retributive nature of his punishment. 203
Moreover, in viewing Panetti’s statements in isolation, the court did not consider
that Panetti’s statement regarding the unjustness of his execution demonstrated the severity
of his mental illness.204 Panetti believed he retrospectively recognized he was insane at the
time he committed the murders because God cured him of mental illness on April 1, 1995,
which he called his “April Fool’s Day Revelation.” 205 After that day he refused to take
antipsychotic medication, believing he was no longer insane.206 He further believed that
196. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36.
197. Id. at *28, *26.
198. Id.
199. Id.; Oral Argument at 19:44, Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 08-705515), available
at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/08/08-70015_6-4-2013.wma.
200. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26, *28; NAMI, supra note 189, at 13.
201. Oral Argument, supra note 199, at 51:06.
202. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *25, *36.
203. Id. In doing so, the court suggests that an individual is not mentally ill if he or she is aware of mental
illness. Again, that is not the Panetti test. Id.
204. Id.
205. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 10-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. Id. Another salient debate is whether it is constitutionally permissible to forcibly medicate insane prisoners in order to execute them. See generally ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 668 (2006); Cf. Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording
Murky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1992); see generally Brian D. Shannon & Victor R. Scarano,
Incompetency to Be Executed: Continuing Ethical Challenges & Time for A Change in Texas, 45 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 419, 451 (2013); see also Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The Illusion of Sanity: The Constitutional and Moral
Danger of Medicating Condemned Prisoners in Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REV. 641, 641-42 (2009)
(“Given the growing number of mentally ill prisoners on death row and the advances of antipsychotic medications, the Supreme Court will likely face questions of whether a medicated, mentally ill prisoner can be executed
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after his revelation God provided him a clean slate, and therefore his execution was not
motivated by retribution for killing his in-laws, but rather by demonic suppression. 207 The
court erred by focusing on Panetti’s statement that his execution was unjust without regard
to the indisputable evidence that indicated otherwise. 208
In substituting its unscientific and subjective conclusions for expert opinions, the
court did not consider that Panetti’s statement was simply a regurgitation of what he heard
while litigating his case.209 Panetti’s statement demonstrated that he was factually aware
of the reasons for his punishment, but did not reveal that he rationally understood it. 210 In
essence, the court coalesced awareness with understanding.211 As explained by NAMI,
“the distinction between ‘awareness’ and ‘understanding’ drawn in Panetti does little good
if state courts continue to conflate the two and if they rely instead on an intuitive, unscientific conception of mental illness.”212 The Supreme Court carefully distinguished
“awareness” and “understanding” in Panetti.213 Conflating the two terms, as the district
court did, does not ensure that the offender recognizes the severity of his crime, and thus,
does not achieve the retributive purpose that the Eight Amendment requires. 214
D.

The Fifth Circuit’s Flaws in Panetti’s Subsequent Habeas Proceeding

In August 2013, the Fifth Circuit once again reviewed the district court’s determination that Panetti was competent for execution.215 “Satisfied that the district court applied
the correct standard,” the Fifth Circuit addressed “whether the district court’s ultimate
findings of competency [was] clearly erroneous in light of the evidence adduced at Panetti’s competency hearing.”216 Ultimately, it affirmed, concluding that Panetti was competent for execution for two reasons. 217 First, there was conflicting expert testimony. 218 Second, the recordings of Panetti’s conversations with his parents corroborated the State’s
experts.219
1. Conflicting Expert Testimony
The court explained that the conflicting expert testimony was sufficient on its own
to sustain the district court’s conclusion. 220 It stated that Dr. Waldman, the State’s chief

and whether a state can force a prisoner to take antipsychotic medication in preparation for execution.”).
207. The Evaluation of Scott Louis Panetti of Alan J. Waldman, M.D., supra note 144. For instance, when Dr.
Waldman asked Panetti “Don’t you think that any of this has something to do with murdering your in-laws,” he
responds “All my guilt has been washed away. When a man is in Christ he is a new creation. I pray that you have
been given in to Christ.” Id.
208. Id.
209. NAMI, supra note 189, at 13.
210. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 955-56 (2007); Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008
WL 2338498, at *36 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
211. NAMI, supra note 189, at 13.
212. Id.
213. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956.
214. Id. at 956; NAMI, supra note 189, at 13.
215. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 410 (5th Cir. 2013).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 410-11.
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expert, concluded that Panetti suffered from no mental illness whatsoever, and thus rationally understood the retributive connection between his crimes and the punishment.221 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s instructions to utilize the expertise of psychiatric science in competency for execution hearings, the Fifth Circuit only effectively considered
the testimony of one expert. 222 That expert was the only expert to claim that Panetti had a
rational understanding of the retributivist value of his execution. 223 Dr. Waldman’s conclusion that Panetti was not mentally ill conflicted with the Supreme Court and years of
psychiatric history, yet the Fifth Circuit ultimately embraced Dr. Waldman’s opinions. 224
Conversely, as recognized by the Fifth Circuit, multiple experts concluded that Panetti genuinely experienced delusions that prevented him from grasping the retributivist
nature of his punishment.225 The court added “that Panetti no longer clearly expressed” the
delusion that his execution was part of a satanic conspiracy to keep him from preaching
when interviewed in December 2007.226 In making this statement, the Fifth Circuit, like
the district court, minimized evidence of Panetti’s mental illness. 227 Dr. Conroy’s statement regarding differences in Panetti’s delusions from her subsequent interview with him
reflected that he was more direct about his delusions in 2004, but in the later interview he
continued to believe his execution to be part of a demonic conspiracy. 228 Nonetheless, the
court determined that one expert disagreeing with multiple experts regarding Panetti’s
competency constituted conflicting expert testimony to which the court must give “great
deference”; thereby affirming the district court’s dependence on Dr. Waldman’s testimony.229
2. Recordings Corroborated Expert Testimony
The Fifth Circuit’s second reason for affirming the district court’s finding of competency was that the recordings corroborated the expert testimony.230 The court found that
the recordings revealed that Panetti had a “remarkably sophisticated understanding of his
capital case,” which indicated he was malingering; that he had the capacity to rationally
understand his situation, as demonstrated by his ability to talk about the death penalty in
an abstract way; and, most notably, that he attributed his conviction to political, not spiritual corruption.231 The court opined that Panetti demonstrated a sophisticated understanding, as evinced by his statements about a character witness, his recognition that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a lethal injection case, and his prediction that the
Supreme Court would again grant certiorari in his case.232 For the court, this demonstrated

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.; Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *25 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
225. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *22. Dr. Conroy explained “that due to Panetti’s ‘severe psychotic condition, he lacks the ability to rationally understand the reasons for his current situation. . . . [believing] that he is on
a mission from God and that evil forces are pursuing his death in order to silence him.’” Id.
229. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411.
230. Id. at 410-11.
231. Id. at 411-12.
232. Id.
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that he was malingering, which implied that Panetti’s cognitive functioning was inconsistent with schizophrenia.233 Moreover, the court’s logic suggested that a prisoner is incompetent for execution only if mental illness cripples reality such that he or she lacks
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case; but, that is not the Panetti
standard.234
Additionally, the court found that the recordings revealed Panetti’s capacity to rationally understand his situation, because he discussed the death penalty’s “moral and political implications.”235 However, in Panetti, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the
competency for execution standard does not turn upon a prisoner’s mental capacity. 236
Resultantly, the Fifth Circuit’s assertion that Panetti’s statements about the death penalty
demonstrated that he was “capable of understanding the retributive connection between
his crime and his punishment,” was largely unhelpful to the Panetti analysis.237 Even if the
court was not referring to Panetti’s capacity when it stated that Panetti was capable of
understanding, the court’s examples do not demonstrate that Panetti rationally understood
that his execution was a result of killing his in-laws.238 The court’s examples include the
following:
On December 4, 2007, Panetti observe[d] that “in the Old Testament
God says the greatest part of justice is mercy. And in the Old Testament
when it comes to the death penalty, you—you gotta have two or more
eyewitnesses. This is in the Old Testament law, and there were many
cities in refuge. Where if there’s any question of someone accidentally
or unknowing [sic] kills somebody, they can go to that city of refuge.”
On the same date, Panetti reflecte[d] on the likelihood that the 2008 election may lead to changes in capital punishment, observing that “it depends on whoever gets the nomination,” that “from what I heard on the
news today, Hillary’s for the death penalty,” and that “[indecipherable]
percentage is against the death penalty.” When Panetti’s mother suggeste[d] that Hillary “works for the Jewish people in her state” and that
Jewish people “believe eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth,” Panetti disagree[d], urging that “[m]ost all Jewish people, because of the Holocaust,
are very much against the death penalty.” 239
These statements indicate at most that Panetti could discuss the death penalty in the abstract, as they did not concern the reasons for his execution; however a schizophrenic’s
delusions are personalized.240 While his statements concerned the death penalty, none pertained to Panetti’s spiritual or moral responsibility for his crimes, and none contradicted

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12.
Id.
Id.; Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26.
Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12.
Id. at 412; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26.
See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 955 (2007).
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Panetti’s fixed belief that evil forces were responsible for his execution. 241
Finally, the court explained that the most damning evidence for Panetti was his attribution of his conviction to political corruption, instead of spiritual corruption. 242 The
court further stated, “[n]ot once [in the recordings, did] Panetti indicate that the State
[sought] his execution to prevent him from ‘preaching the Gospel,’ as his delusions allegedly cause[d] him to believe.”243 However, the court ignored that Panetti referred to the
trial judge as a “devil worshipper” in the recordings. 244 Panetti spoke of political corruption
but the recordings contained evidence of Panetti’s delusions, as well.245 The court’s statement that Panetti rationally understood that his execution was a consequence of his crime,
merely because he stated, “Fredericksburg had to have a hanging,” bore the most concern.246 Viewing this statement in context, it demonstrated that Panetti believed that a demonic conspiracy unjustly sought his execution. 247
3. Summarizing the Fifth Circuit’s Failings
Essentially, in giving great deference to the district court, the Fifth Circuit found that
Panetti was competent to face execution, disregarding much evidence that warranted an
opposite result.248 Not only did the court ignore evidence of Panetti’s severe mental illness,
it contradicted psychiatric science by equating Panetti’s cognitive functioning with his rational functioning.249 Given the importance of the issue determined in this case—whether
the State could take Scott Panetti’s life—the Fifth Circuit should have more thoughtfully
considered the evidence before it.250 The Fifth Circuit’s message is clear.251 That is, in any
case where a district court parrots the correct standard, it need not meaningfully apply that
standard so long as there is a shred of conflicting expert evidence, even when a man’s life
is at stake.252 At least that was the result for Scott Panetti.253
IV.

ISSUES HIGHLIGHTED BY PANETTI’S SUBSEQUENT HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Though Panetti established a substantive test for competency, Panetti II highlighted
significant challenges for the severely mentally ill on death row. 254 First, Panetti II illustrated the courts’ misconceptions of mental illness.255 Second, those misconceptions
demonstrated a need for psychological science to aid the courts in distinguishing awareness from understanding.256 Third, Panetti II signaled a need for an evidentiary standard
241. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26.
242. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12.
243. Id. at 412.
244. Oral Argument, supra note 199, at 51:06.
245. Id.
246. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 412 (internal quotation marks omitted).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 410.
249. Id. at 411-12.
250. Id.
251. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 410.
254. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 398; Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 26, 2008).
255. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *24-26, *28-29, *36.
256. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss1/8

22

Arnold: The Challenge of "Rationally Understanding" A Schzophrenic's Delu

“RATIONALLY UNDERSTANDING”

2014]

265

to ensure meaningful consideration of the all of the evidence in competency for execution
hearings.257 Finally, Panetti II indicated a great disadvantage for the indigent mentally ill
prisoner.258
A.

Understanding Cognitive Functioning Verses Rational Thinking

Panetti II highlights the criminal justice system’s failure to recognize that those who
suffer from mental illness do not necessarily have deficient cognitive functioning. 259 Mental illness is not the same as mental retardation.260 Mental health professionals understand
that individuals who suffer from psychotic disorders do not necessarily suffer other types
of impairments, allowing a severely ill individual to appear greatly intelligent. 261 John
Forbes Nash’s story illustrates this point.262 Nash won the Nobel Prize for his contributions
to game theory, while believing that aliens from outer space recruited him to save the
world.263 He later stated, “the ideas I had about supernatural beings came to me the same
way that my mathematical ideas did.”264 In this same way, Panetti’s ability to sophisticatedly understand his case and his cognizance of the adversarial nature of the justice system
did not demonstrate his rational understanding of his punishment. 265
B.

Distinguishing Awareness and Understanding

In addition, the courts’ misconceptions regarding mental illness reflected the importance of professional guidance in competency hearings to distinguish awareness from
understanding.266 Though the holding in Panetti theoretically championed a stringent competency standard, the lower courts conflation of understanding and awareness largely strip
Panetti of any protective effect.267 Conflation occurs when a court, as did the courts in
Panetti II, infers that a prisoner rationally understands the reason for the punishment
merely because he or she can recite those reasons. 268 Such inferences do not ensure that a
prisoner rationally understands the retributivist thrust of his or her punishment. 269 The Panetti II courts recognized the distinction by modeling the correct standard, yet confused
awareness with understanding by assuming that Panetti rationally understood the reason
for his punishment once they decided that Panetti was aware of his case and the adversarial

257. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411.
258. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013); Panetti v.
Thaler, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013).
259. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *24-26, *28-29, *36.
260. NAMI, supra note 189, at 5-6.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. (citing E.F. TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A MANUAL FOR FAMILIES, PATIENTS, AND
PROVIDERS 25-26 (5th ed. 2006)).
264. Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. NAMI supra note 189, at 5-6 (citing E.F. TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A MANUAL FOR
FAMILIES, PATIENTS, AND PROVIDERS 25-26 (5th ed. 2006)).
266. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 955 (2007); Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008
WL 2338498, at *24-26, *28-29, *36 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008); NAMI, supra note 189, at 5-6.
267. NAMI, supra note 189, at 5-6.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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process.270
Distinguishing understanding from awareness is difficult; and thus courts should
base their competency findings on probing questions by qualified experts in structured
competency examinations, instead of “attempting to isolate remarks evincing an inmate’s
cognitive awareness from a pervasive and deeply-embedded delusional belief system,” as
the courts did in Panetti II.271
C.

Shifting the Second Burden of Proof to the State

Panetti II also indicated that Panetti’s stringent standard meant nothing in the absence of an appropriately placed evidentiary burden.272 As in demonstrated by Panetti II,
allocating the burden of proof to the prisoner can be dispositive of the outcome in competency for execution hearings.273 Panetti bore the initial burden of making a substantial
showing of insanity and the subsequent burden of proving his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.274 On remand, the courts determined that Panetti failed to meet
his burden despite their recognition that Panetti was seriously mentally ill because the record contained conflicting expert testimony.275 In most cases, though, conflicting expert
testimony is commonplace, thereby restricting the likelihood that courts will find insane
prisoners competent for execution; and thus in “cases where evidence is conflicting and
experts for the parties disagree on the defendant’s level of competence, maintaining the
double burden created by the Panetti II court[s] will result in repeated Eighth Amendment
violations.”276
Additionally, as recognized by the Supreme Court, when a person’s life is at stake,
“the risk of error that the law can tolerate is correspondingly diminished.” 277 Similarly, in
Ford, the Court eloquently stated, “the ascertainment of a prisoner’s sanity as a predicate
to lawful execution calls for no less stringent standards than those demanded in any other
aspect of a capital proceedings’ due to the ‘high regard for truth that befits a decision
affecting the life or death of a human being.” 278 Placing a double burden on a prisoner to
demonstrate incompetency is not only unsupported by case law but is repugnant to it and
the common understanding of justice.279 For Scott Panetti the double burden was fatal. 280
D.

Recognizing the Detriment of Indigence on the Severely Mentally Ill Prisoner

270. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 555; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *24-26, *28-29, *36; NAMI, supra note 189, at
5-6.
271. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 258, at 15, 24.
272. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 411 (5th Cir. 2013); Greenberg, supra note 11, at 255.
273. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 255.
274. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411.
275. Id.
276. Danielle N. Devens, Competency for Execution in the Wake of Panetti: Shifting the Burden to the Government, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1335, 1365-66 (2010) (emphasis added).
277. Id. (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 362 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
278. Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. Id.
280. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 410; Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
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Finally, Panetti II demonstrated the insurmountable disparity between the indigent
mentally ill prisoner and the State.281 The district court provided Panetti $5,000 for experts,
while the State paid Dr. Waldman alone more than $22,000.282 As a result, the State deposed all of the defense experts, and paid Dr. Waldman to attend two defense expert depositions and inspect the defense experts’ documents.283 At trial, the State experts remained
in the courtroom throughout the hearing and assisted State counsel during cross-examination of defense witnesses.284 Panetti’s funds restricted his experts to provide approximately
ten hours of assistance each, primarily exhausted by review of Panetti’s thirty-year psychiatric history and interviewing him. 285 Most damning to Panetti, though, was the State’s
ability to pay its experts to analyze the recorded conversations between Panetti and his
family.286 Those recordings weighed heavily in the courts’ finding that Panetti rationally
understood his punishment, yet Panetti had no opportunity to challenge the significant of
the recordings.287
V.

CONCLUSION

Panetti II signified a long road ahead for the severely mentally ill on death row. 288
More than twenty years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ford, which established a
categorical death penalty exemption for the insane, the Court provided a substantive test
in Panetti to ensure that an insane prisoner awaiting death rationally understands the retributive thrust of his or her punishment, which the Eighth Amendment requires. 289 Though
Panetti theoretically championed a protective competency standard, the rational understanding standard had no protective effect as applied by the district court and the Fifth
Circuit.290 In essence, the district court and Fifth Circuit’s application of the rational understanding standard was reprehensively deficient, because they trivialized and ignored
symptoms of Panetti’s genuine and severe psychiatric disorder.291 The courts relied on a

281. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 259.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 410 (5th Cir. 2013).
288. Id.; Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). The
Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Ferguson v. Sec., Fla. Dept. of
Corr., No. 13-5507, 2013 WL 3930521, at *10-15 (S. Ct. July 26, 2013) explains that some courts do not read
Panetti as requiring a change in their awareness-centered standards, while some courts, like the courts in Panetti
II, model the correct standard, yet misapply it. The Eleventh Circuit concluded “Panetti did not abrogate or
otherwise reject the awareness standard articulated by Justice Powell, nor did it impose a new, more rigorous
standard for assessing competency to be executed.” Instead, it determined that Panetti rejected “an overly narrow
interpretation of Ford that deems a prisoner's mental illness and delusional beliefs irrelevant to whether he can
understand the fact of his impending execution and the reason for it.” Id. By contrast the Supreme Court of
Indiana modeled the correct standard, but misapplied it, concluding that a prisoner was competent because no
evidence indicated that he questioned the reality that his execution was punishment for his crime, though he
believed that devils and demons were responsible for the crime. Id.
289. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986), Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007).
290. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958; Panetti, 727 F.3d 298; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498.
291. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 414; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *37.
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single expert’s testimony, which contradicted years of psychiatric diagnoses. 292 Consequently, the courts found support for that expert’s opinion by extracting and isolating a
few of Panetti’s statements, basing their ultimate findings of Panetti’s competence on unscientific misapprehensions of mental illness. 293
Though the Supreme Court recognized value in the aid of psychological science in
competency hearings, the courts’ errors demonstrated the imperativeness of well-qualified
experts to distinguish a prisoner’s awareness from his or her understanding. 294 Additionally, competency hearings commonly include conflicting expert testimony due to the complexities of mental illness. Thus placing a double evidentiary burden on the prisoner diminishes the protective effect of the Panetti standard.295 Finally, Panetti II illustrated the
fatal effects of indigence on the mentally ill death row inmate, as Panetti’s indigence prevented him from hiring an expert to assess his recorded statements on which the courts
heavily relied.296
On January 27, 2014, Panetti filed a new petition for writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court. Though the Court may ultimately deny certiorari, the district court
and Fifth Circuit’s failings demonstrate the need for further clarification to insulate the
severely ill on death row from executions.297 The deficient record in Panetti prevented the
Court from providing more definitive guidelines for competency determinations, thus, one
task for the district court on remand was to develop a more complete record.298 Having
now a more thorough record than in 2007, the Court may take Panetti II as an opportunity
to provide additional guidelines to prevent courts from removing the protective effect of
the rational understanding standard, as states continue to execute insane prisoners. 299 The
Court should grant certiorari and recognize that for Panetti to have any significance courts
must resist basing competency decisions on unscientific misapprehensions of mental illness and instead meaningfully consider the conclusions of qualified mental health professionals.300 The Court’s failure to do so will allow the State of Texas to execute Scott Louis
Panetti without indication that his execution serves any retributive or consequential aim
that the Eighth Amendment requires.301
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